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HARMONIZING PLURAL SOCIETIES:  THE 
CASE OF LASALLIANS, FAMILIES, 
SCHOOLS—AND THE POOR 
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN†
“[I]s the life of the society to be conceived as inherent or derived?  
Does the Church exist by some living force, with powers of self-
development like a person; or is she a mere aggregate, a fortuitous 
concourse of ecclesiastical atoms, treated it may be as one for 
purposes of convenience, but with no real claim to a mind or will 
of her own, except so far as the civil power sees to invest her for the 
nonce with a fiction of unity?”1
 
“By reason of its identity, therefore, the Catholic school is a place 
of ecclesial experience, which is moulded in the Christian 
community.  However, it should not be forgotten that the school 
fulfils its vocation to be a genuine experience of the Church only if 
†  John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, 
Villanova University School of Law. The germ of this paper was the author’s keynote 
address at the marvelous June 2005 conference on “school choice” that was 
sponsored by the Brothers of the Christian Schools at Mont La Salle, Napa. For their 
kind invitation and gracious hospitality, I am grateful to all of the Brothers, 
especially Brother Stanislaus, as well as to their collaborators Jack Coons and Tom 
Brady. For their penetrating comments on that occasion, I am grateful to Jesse 
Choper, Steve Sugarman, and Michael Guerra. I am also grateful to Brothers 
Edmond LaRouche, Michael McGinnis, Joseph Grabenstein, and George Van 
Grieken for help of various kinds in connection with my preparation of this paper. A 
special debt runs to Russell Hittinger; as the documentation herein attests, his work 
on the history of modern Catholic social thought has had a unique role in opening 
my eyes to new questions and directions. My thanks are also due to members of the 
audiences at St. John’s University School of Law and the University of St. Thomas 
School of Law in Minnesota where I presented versions of this paper in the Spring of 
2006; the comments of Susan Stabile, Larry Winer, and Nelson Tebbe at St. John’s, 
and Elizabeth Schiltz, Thomas Mengler, Charles Reid, and Greg Sisk at St. Thomas 
were especially helpful. I dedicate this paper to Brother R. Columban, F.S.C. At 92 
years of age, he remains a Brothers’ Brother, full of love for the Church, the 
Institute, youths of every background, and, above all, the Lord whom he serves in 
joy. 
1 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 40 (Thoemmes Press 
1997) (1914). 
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it takes its stand within the organic pastoral work of the 
Christian community. . . .  In the life of the Church, the Catholic 
school is recognised above all as an expression of those Religious 
Institutes which, according to their proper charism or specific 
apostolate, have dedicated themselves generously to education.”2
INTRODUCTION:  AFTER MUNERA 
The current system of support and supervision of primary 
and secondary schools across the United States is grossly out of 
line with primary principles of Catholic social thought.  More 
specifically, the American educational apparatus stands square 
in the way of non-rich families fulfilling their mission and, 
coordinately, of the Church’s fulfilling hers.  These are the 
principal claims for which I shall argue here, and I shall do so 
from the angle of a concrete work of the Catholic Church in the 
United States today.  It was the foundering of this particular 
work that concentrated my attention on how families and schools 
disappear in the sea that dissolves societies or, in a more 
technical idiom, group persons.  “One of the mottoes of modern 
absolutism,” F.W. Maitland observed, has been that “the absolute 
State face[s] the absolute individual.”3  The Church, however, 
joins Maitland in reminding the absolutizing state that “[g]roup-
personality is no purely legal phenomenon.”4
Rather than on group-personality, recent literature 
developing the implications of Catholic social thought for 
education reform in the U.S. has tended to focus on the principle 
of subsidiarity.5  Subsidiarity in turn has frequently been 
understood, in the education-reform debate as elsewhere, as a 
2 PREFECT PIO CARD. LAGHI & ARCHBISHOP JOSÉ SARAIVA MARTINS, CIRCULAR 
LETTER OF THE CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUC. THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL ON 
THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM ¶¶ 12–13 (1997), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccath
educ_doc_27041998_school2000_en.html. 
3 F. W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 66 (David Runciman & 
Magnus Ryan eds., 2003). 
4 Id. at 68. 
5 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: 
Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 
1305–07 (2002); Michael P. Moreland, Subsidiarity, Localism, and School Finance, 2 
J. OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 369, 369–70, 397–400 (2005); see also JOHN PAUL II, 
PAPAL LETTER LETTER TO FAMILIES ¶ 16 (1994) (urging that the “mission of 
education . . . always be carried out in accordance with a proper application of the 
principle of subsidiarity”). 
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directive toward devolution of power and responsibility from the 
state to the smallest group that is capable of performing a 
specific task.6  A mandate for divestiture from above, subsidiarity 
is celebrated as a check on the monopolistic tendencies of the 
modern state; it is a plea for localism and doing things at the 
lowest possible level.7
The usually unspoken assumption of such subsidiarity 
analysis seems to be that (legitimate) power starts at the top and 
is allowed (or not allowed) to trickle down, based on someone’s or 
a hegemonic group’s cost-benefit analysis; the power that decends 
does so with no given specific, necessary destination.8  In such a 
tractionless environment, subsidiarity is malleable and easily 
manipulated, and therefore unthreatening to all but the biggest 
consolidators of power.9  In the eyes of Catholic social thought, 
6 See, e.g., ANTHONY S. BRYK, VALERIE E. LEE & PETER B. HOLLAND, CATHOLIC 
SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 45 (1993); TRACEY ROWLAND, CULTURE AND THE 
THOMIST TRADITION: AFTER VATICAN II 61 (2005) (describing “the traditional 
principle ‘subsidiarity,’ according to which decision-making authority should be 
decentralized to the lowest level at which the decision can competently be made”); 
Lucia A. Silecchia, Catholic Social Teaching and Its Impact on American Law: Some 
Observations on the Past and Reflections on the Future, 1 J. OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 
277, 301 (2004) (“[T]he Church preaches the principle of subsidiarity, consistently 
teaching that problems should be resolved at the lowest level capable of effectively 
doing so.”); cf. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond 
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 116 (2001) [hereinafter Vischer, Principle of 
Governance] (“Subsidiarity is not a knee-jerk shunning of government authority . . . . 
Rather, subsidiarity is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the local 
level and empowering individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more 
efficaciously in their own lives. In this regard, the focus is on fostering the vitality of 
mediating structures in society.”). For the reasons developed infra text at notes 127–
34, subsidiarity, as understood in Catholic social teaching, does not “empower;” 
rather, at least some of the time, it recognizes and gives effect to an anterior 
distribution of ruling power. 
7 See BRYK ET AL., supra note 6, at 45, 301–02; Vischer, Principle of Governance, 
supra note 6, at 122–23. 
8 Cf. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social 
Doctrine, PROVIDENCE: STUDIES IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION, at 59 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hittinger, Social Pluralism] (“In papal teachings since Pius XI, subsidiarity is 
proposed as a principle of non-absorption, not a principle that necessarily requires 
devolution. As it is commonly understood, devolution is the opposite of subsidiarity. 
For devolution presupposes either: (a) an ontological deficiency, measured by a kind 
of cost-benefit analysis, or (b) that the central government rightly possesses a 
plenary power that it has now decided to redistribute to other powers and 
authorities.”). 
9 See Moreland, supra note 5, at 369 (“A recurring theme in the literature on 
subsidiarity is that the principle of subsidiarity is indeterminate, vague, and 
ultimately unhelpful to the resolution of concrete legal and policy questions . . . . The 
church’s own teaching documents contribute to this apparent uncertainty by 
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however, subsidiarity does not govern—even if, per impossibile, it 
could do such a thing—devolution of power from a top, central 
locus. 
Rather, subsidiarity governs relations in a world in which 
ruling power has already been, at least in part, distributed in 
munera.  The defect of the typical subsidiarity analysis is that it 
slights or denies subsidiarity’s necessary predicate or correlate, 
the munus.  The Latin word munus, of which the plural is 
munera, is translated variously as function, gift, vocation, or 
mission.10  To recognize munera is to recognize that specific 
functions have been (or should be) assigned to specific 
individuals or specific societies.  One can safely speculate that 
the cause of the submersion of the concept of munus, or at least 
part of that cause, is its irremediably pre-modern claims.  The 
Second Vatican Council, however, used the word munus at least 
248 times, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997) and 
the Code of Canon Law (1983) have continued apace.11
A semi-technical exposition of munera will be necessary, but 
we can begin by observing that it has been a central thesis of the 
philosophia perennis that every natural kind has a given 
“function” or (in Greek) ergon.  In the words of Aristotle, early in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or 
activities, and has man none?  Is he born without a function?  
Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently 
has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a 
function apart from all these?  What then can this be?12
Aristotle follows this series of questions with a dialectic from 
which he famously concludes that the function of man is an 
activity of the soul according to a rational principle13—a thesis 
speaking of subsidiarity as counseling devolution of authority in some circumstances 
but centralization of authority in others.”). 
10 THE POCKET OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 87 (James Morwood ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1994). 
11 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 55. 
12 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 13, I.7 1097b29 33 (Sir David Ross 
trans., 1925). 
13 See id. at 13–14, I.7 1097a33, 1098a29. While Aristotle’s central thesis is 
clear, much of the important detail is controverted. See, e.g., H. H. JOACHIM, 
ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 50 (1951); RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE ON 
THE HUMAN GOOD 312–57 (1989) (expanding on Aristotle’s function argument and 
considering it in a larger context); Richard Kraut, The Peculiar Function of Human 
Beings, 9 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 467, 467–78 (1979) (questioning and clarifying Aristotle’s 
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that Thomas Aquinas took up and, as they say, baptized.  In the 
words of the twentieth-century Thomist Jacques Maritain (1882–
1973), the natural law of every natural kind is its “normality of 
functioning.”14
To the classical thesis on the function of natural kinds, 
modern philosophy has not been kind—and the case is a fortiori 
with respect to the related thesis that human societies or “group 
persons,” not just individuals or parts thereof, come bearing 
functions. 
The Catholic Church, however, continues to teach—indeed, 
has clarified and magnified her teaching—that not only 
individual persons, but also human societies or “group persons” 
bear distinct functions.  As Russell Hittinger has shown, the 
Church over the last century has developed her teaching on 
human functionality, through a new a focus on and amplification 
of the concept of munus.15  Professor Hittinger opines that “the 
idea of munus holds together the Aristotelian notion of ergon or 
characteristic function with the more biblical concept of  vocation 
or mission.”16  In refining the function thesis, the Church has 
been responding to the uniquely modern claim that both human 
individuals and human societies lack munera altogether.17  In a 
world without munera, anything goes and nothing is required.  
By denying the existence of mandatory munera that precede 
creation by the state, the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth 
century robbed the basic human societies of their legal 
personality, and having denied their right to exist, frequently 
denied them opportunity to exist.  In a world that respects 
munera, as the Popes have reminded the world, individuals and 
groups have work to do and gifts to exchange. 
Although it conceals a totalitarian face, the contemporary 
American educational apparatus is ruthless in its pitting of the 
individual—or, rather, some individuals—against the putatively 
sovereign state.  Rich and middle-class families are at liberty to 
transport their lucky children whithersoever they choose, but the 
rest, people of low income and the poor, are compelled to meet 
passage on the function of human beings). 
14 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 87 (1951). 
15 See Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 54–63. 
16 Id. at 57. 
17 See id. at 52–54. 
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the state face to face in the confines of the neighborhood school.18  
Unlucky parents and children must take whatever the state 
serves up in terms of education, no matter the violence to the 
integrity of the family and its firmly held convictions.19  An 
educational apparatus that respected munera would allow the 
family, and other implicated societies such as church and school, 
to fulfill their respective functions, including education into the 
truth as understood by family and church. 
My own thinking on these questions has been concentrated, 
as I mentioned, by a particular work, that of the Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools.  More commonly known today 
as the De La Salle Christian Brothers, after their founder St. 
John Baptist de La Salle (1651–1717), they were my teachers and 
mentors when I was growing up in California.  The germ of the 
present paper grew out of the Brothers’ welcome invitation to join 
a team assembled to consider some of the challenges and 
opportunities the Brothers face today.  The Brothers’ concrete 
munus focused my considerations; conditions that might yet 
allow it to be fulfilled are my concern.  There is risk that the 
narrative the Brothers made available to generations of 
youngsters may soon have run its course in the United States. 
Thriving throughout much of the world until a generation 
ago, not least in the U.S., the Institute that La Salle founded in 
France in 1680 is facing possible extinction in this country.  
Although many (though by no means most) of the schools the 
Brothers built in the U.S. remain open today, they are staffed 
and administered almost exclusively by dedicated lay men and 
women.  La Salle’s Institute is disappearing before our eyes.  Not 
a soul entered the Brothers’ one remaining U.S. novitiate in 
2005, and the novitiate class of 2004 ended with just two 
members.  Such numbers (of which zero is more common than 
two) have come to be expected, and there is no terrestrial reason 
to anticipate abrupt reversal.  The Brother Archivist at La Salle 
University (Philadelphia) reports that whereas there were 2,995 
Brothers in the United States in 1965, today there are just 816.  
Many among those 816 are over sixty years-old.  The Brothers’ 
retirement communities swell to overflowing, as the active 
18 JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 11–12 (1999). 
19 See id. at 11 (noting that children from poor backgrounds have fewer 
educational options than children from more comfortable backgrounds). 
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communities dwindle and close.  The result is that within a 
generation or two, the United States could find itself without the 
historically robust service of the Catholic Church’s largest 
congregation of men devoted exclusively to teaching, and to 
teaching youth specifically. 
The passing of the Brothers takes on a special salience from 
the fact that the Brothers have dedicated themselves and their 
efforts, from the moment La Salle set to work, to “service of the 
poor through education.”  Many individuals and societies in the 
Church serve the poor, and many serve as educators.  To serve 
poor children through Christian education, this was La Salle’s 
enduring, and radiating, innovation; it is the Brothers’ distinctive 
munus. 
But yes, a thousand times yes:  Today and in recent history, 
the Brothers in the U.S. have been serving mostly middle-class 
and rich children.  La Salle himself insisted that the Brothers’ 
teaching be free, and, until a generation or two ago, the Brothers 
in the U.S. were able to provide comparatively inexpensive 
education, as well as ample scholarships for those in need of 
them, thanks in part to the Brothers not collecting salaries.20  
The Brothers’ vowed poverty served the needs of children who 
happened to be poor. 
The shifting cultural and specifically economic realities of 
today, however, have meant that schools that used to be widely 
affordable increasingly are accessible only to the well-off.21  Lay 
teachers deserve a living wage.  Lasallians have struggled 
mightily to keep their schools accessible to poor and low-income 
families, but, notwithstanding some impressive support from 
benefactors, more and more poor children are unreachable by 
those who have ardently sought to serve them. 
No doubt, there are many and interrelated causes of their 
shrinking numbers in the U.S.  The bald and sad fact, however, 
is that the Lasallians are losing ground in their fight to serve the 
poor through education, because, increasingly, they cannot afford 
to provide education to poor and low-income families.  And when 
20 In some places, including the one I was blessed to know as a child, the 
Brothers subsidized their schools through the manufacture and sale of wine and 
spirits. 
21 See Valerie Strauss, $26,000 Cost Pushes Up Barriers to Area Private Schools, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2006, at A1 (describing how rising tuition costs are putting 
private schools out of reach for poor and middle-class children). 
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an Institute can no longer do the work that is its to perform, who 
in his right mind would feel a divine call to join in such work?  
The shortage of Brothers and the Brothers’ inability to do their 
work combine to cause each other.  The result is that at a time 
when America’s poor children are more desperate than ever for 
worthy education, some of poor children’s most ardent advocates 
in the United States are going the way of the Passenger Pigeon, 
and, at least in part, for systemic reasons of which the Brothers 
are innocent.  Sadly but not inevitably, American social and legal 
soil does not nourish the Lasallians’ particular munus, service of 
the poor through education. 
The interlocking luck of wealth, location, and property taxes 
results, under our current education dispensation, in the 
conscription of low-income children by local public schools.  There 
do remain the exceptional cases in which scholarships deliver 
poor children to schools of their parents’ choosing, but the legally-
sanctioned situation renders poor and low-income parents unable 
to make educational choices that rich people make every day.  
Much of the “Catholic” literature on school choice takes the 
family, or occasionally the “preferential option for the poor,” as a 
starting point.  The different, though largely complementary and 
certainly broader, angle pursued here concerns not just the 
family or distributive justice, but the freedom of expansion of 
group persons, including the Institute of the Brothers of the 
Christian Schools and their particular schools.  Thought and 
practice that fail to respect the plural munera of distinct societies 
lead inexorably to the atomized world in which individuals, and 
poor people especially, face the monolithic state one by one. 
If, instead, we respect these societies for what they are and 
can be, then the question we must go on to ask is how to support 
and coordinate the plural munera of plural societies.  The 
pluralist must face the issues the totalizer would bowdlerize.  
Although direct aid to religious societies, such as the Brothers or 
their schools, is out of the question in the U.S. today, aid to 
families, who can then enlist the services of religious societies, is, 
to the extent the rule of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris22 holds, a 
possibility.  Zelman is a development and application of the 
principle of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,23 according to which 
22 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
23 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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principle the state may not “unreasonably interfer[e] with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”24
This paper comprises five parts.  Part I develops the 
particular munus that is the Brothers’.  Some readers may prefer 
to skip ahead to Part II and come at once to my argument about 
munera, societies, and subsidiarity in general.  An intellectual 
advantage to a prior immersion in the Brothers’ munus is that it 
brings into relief a fact frequently elided in our American 
discourse: the individual-versus-the-state model, to which we are 
becoming inured, damages not just the family, but also other 
institutions vital to the good of civil society and, yes, the Church 
in all her members.  Part of the legitimate state’s responsibility 
is to contribute to group-persons’ satisfaction of their respective 
munera.  These conditions are neglected at our common peril, 
though—and this is the crux of the matter—frequently without 
many people’s quite noticing.  As Professor Joseph Viteritti has 
observed, 
 If there is any danger inherent in the relationship between 
religious institutions and government that pertains in the 
United States, it has little to do with the eventuality of an 
established church.  Our great risk arises from the fact that 
because so few Americans live their lives according to the strict 
dictates of their faith, the majority of us do not appreciate the 
strength of the moral obligations that compel devout observers.  
We need to be reminded that such people exist, and that it was 
for their sake that the First Amendment was written.  We 
should not expect them to accept the secularist ethos that most 
Americans are comfortable with, or to do deal with their faith 
on the same terms that the rest of us do.25
“Such people” include the Lasallians with devout desire to 
the work of the Church for the poor.  Who can justify the 
systemic frustration of the Lasallians’ zeal to do their corporate 
religious work for the good of the Church and God’s children, 
especially the poor, for the good of families, and for the common 
good?  Neglect overtakes justification, and here we are:  Group 
persons are simply occluded, their munera ignored. 
24 Id. at 534–35. The “principle” of Pierce was “reaffirm[ed]” in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). Also see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 
(2000). 
25 VITERITTI, supra note 18, at 208. 
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In Part II, I develop and analyze the concept of “society” or 
‘group person,’ the social significance of societies’ respective 
munera, and, finally, the content of subsidiarity in a world that 
respects group persons and their respective munera.  In sum, the 
Catholic expectation is one of plural societies, with their 
respective authorities, harmonized by appropriate subsidium.  
Returning to schools and families, I summarize in Part III the 
Catholic position with respect to locating and sharing 
responsibility for education.  It is the munus of the family to be 
the primary provider of education of its children, though 
frequently it will require help in meeting this mission.  In Part 
IV, I measure aspects of my thesis against recent work on school 
choice and subsidiarity, arguing that Catholic social thought, as 
developed earlier in the paper, allows us to “take Pierce 
seriously,” but requires us also to reject an understanding of 
subsidiarity that prefers in-principle “value pluralism” to respect 
for the munera granted by creation and redemption.  Admittedly, 
there is an element of wheel-reinvention to all of this.  Already in 
his 1939 encyclical Divini Illius Magistri, Pope Pius XI (citing 
and quoting the Pierce case!) said this: 
 It must be borne in mind also that the obligation of the family 
to bring up children, includes not only religious and moral 
education, but physical and civic education as well, principally 
in so far as it touches upon religion and morality. 
 This incontestable right of the family has at various times been 
recognized by nations anxious to respect the natural law in 
their civil enactments.  Thus, to give one recent example, the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America, in a decision on 
an important controversy, declared that it is not in the 
competence of the State to fix any uniform standard of 
education by forcing children to receive instruction exclusively 
in public schools, and it bases its decision on the natural law: 
the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with 
the high duty, to educate him and prepare him for the 
fulfilment of his obligations.26
I.  THE LASALLIAN MUNUS AND MINISTRY 
The characteristic Lasallian contribution is the one made in 
26 PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ¶¶ 36–37 (1939) 
[hereinafter DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ]. 
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the quiet obscurity of the classroom—but, as already indicated, 
not just any classroom, for any old reason.  The insight on the 
basis of which the Lasallians above all can enrich today’s world is 
the one Jacques Maritain attributed to St. La Salle in these 
beautifully stark terms: “this priest of heroic self-devotion and 
profound spirituality had the deep insight that the poor have a 
right to education, which was synonymous for him—and remains 
synonymous for his sons—with Christian education.”27  Some 
three centuries before both the United Nations’ 1959 Declaration 
on the Rights of the Child and the Second Vatican Council’s echo 
of that U.N. declaration in its own 1965 Declaration on Christian 
Education (Gravissimum Educationis), John Baptist de La Salle 
declared the right and sought, through the work of his Institute, 
to satisfy it.  This is the core of La Salle’s spiritual patrimony; 
service to the poor through education is the Institute’s munus. 
But what of the fact that today’s world differs in so many 
respects from the world LaSalle faced?  The world has changed; 
how should the Brothers change?  As Brother George Van 
Grieken, F.S.C., observes in Touching the Hearts of Students: 
Characteristics of Lasallian Schools:  “To do justice to De La 
Salle’s charism in the contemporary world, one must do justice 
both to the nature of that charism and to the nature of the 
contemporary world, placing them in critical dialogue with each 
other.”28  We can begin this dialogue by inquiring how those who 
claim La Salle, whom Pope Pius XII in 1950 named “Patron of All 
Teachers of Youth,” as their inspiration should shape themselves 
and their work in this world of ours that is so different from any 
that has been seen before.  How ought the Brothers respond to 
and work within a legal culture that denies the conditions 
necessary to satisfaction of their munus?  As Jacques Maritain 
said to the Brothers in 1951, on the occasion of the tercentenary 
celebration of La Salle’s birth, “genuine spiritual faithfulness is 
free from merely material attachment to custom, even venerable, 
and that in circumstances basically different the same spirit and 
the same aims must be served by different methods of 
27 Jacques Maritain, Manhattan College Address (Apr. 30, 1951), available at 
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/jm315.htm (emphasis added) (original 
emphasis omitted). 
28 GEORGE VAN GRIEKEN, TOUCHING THE HEARTS OF STUDENTS: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LASALLIAN SCHOOLS 121 (1999). 
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application.”29  If Maritain is right that no blind adherence to old 
ways of doing things can go unchallenged, he is also right that 
nothing short of genuine spiritual faithfulness will do.  The 
spiritual bequest of La Salle is a gift to the whole Church, but it 
remains the special trust of the Brothers of the Christian 
Schools, as Brother Luke Salm, F.S.C., acknowledges, while also 
sounding a word of warning: 
 The spiritual vision of De La Salle could never have survived to 
enrich future generations of Brothers, students and colleagues, 
if the community had not achieved institutional form.  Its 
formally approved and clearly defined juridical character is a 
necessary and important guarantee that the legacy of De La 
Salle will have stability and permanence, that the spirituality 
and the charism of the Founder can be kept alive, developed, 
and transmitted from one generation to the next.  Thus it is the 
Institute itself that constitutes the total legacy of John Baptist 
de La Salle.30
The Brothers are fewer and fewer, but, as long as it lasts, the 
Institute that comprises them retains its distinct munus in the 
life of the Church and the world she serves, a function growing 
out of La Salle’s unique charism and vision.  The munus of the 
Lasallians cannot be altogether “outsourced.”31  Their 
29 Maritain, supra note 27. 
30 LUKE SALM, F.S.C., THE WORK IS YOURS: THE LIFE OF SAINT JOHN BAPTIST 
DE LA SALLE 203 (2d ed. 1996). 
31 Many Catholic orders are in decline, of course, but the Brothers, like so many 
other lay congregations, have fared far worse than most of the venerable clerical 
orders. Without Holy Orders and a sacramental ministry as ballast and direction, 
the Brothers, especially in the U.S., have been hurtling toward dissolution. But will 
the disappearance of the Brothers spell the end of the Lasallian story in the U.S.? 
Perhaps, but not necessarily. 
 Today’s Brothers have resolved and undertaken to preserve the spiritual and 
some of the institutional legacy of La Salle. They are attempting to do this by 
entering into “partnership” with lay men and women in the work that was once the 
Brothers’ alone. What used to be Brothers’ schools—schools staffed exclusively (or 
predominantly) by Brothers and led by a Brother—are being succeeded by “Lasallian 
schools”—schools staffed and led by dedicated lay people in cooperation with a 
handful of Brothers whose new work it is to imbue their partners with the essentials 
of Lasallian spirituality and pedagogy. 
 We can ask whether it would make sense to speak of Lasallian schools if no 
Christian Brothers were anywhere to be found, but this is a question we need not 
face, at least not yet. And though we can brood over the notorious impossibility and 
collateral costs of “institutionalizing” charism, at the same time we should hope that 
the special gift of St. La Salle to the Church and the world will not evaporate in 
proportion to the number of Brothers who continue to live by the Saint’s Rule. We 
cannot predict the results of the Brothers’ and their Partners’ current efforts, but, in 
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characteristic function is—or should be—what is supported and 
sought, as it is irreducibly theirs. 
This point made by Brothers, and made to the Brothers by 
Maritain, is made more generally by the Church, and in 
particular in the authoritative teaching of the Second Vatican 
Council in its norms for the renewal of the religious life.  There 
has been a tendency on the part of some since Vatican II to 
“explor[e] now this and now that new possibility.”32  What the 
Church asks of religious societies or institutes is fidelity to their 
proper munera: 
 It is for the good of the Church that institutes have their own 
proper character and functions [munera].  Therefore the spirit 
and aims of each founder should be faithfully accepted and 
retained, as indeed should each institute’s sound traditions, for 
all of these constitute the patrimony of an institute. . . .  All 
institutes should share in the life of the Church.  They should 
make their own and should foster to the best of their ability, in 
a manner consonant with their own natures, its initiatives and 
undertakings . . . .33
As today the Brothers renew their Institute and its work 
through re-appropriation of the spirit and aims of St. La Salle, 
trying (what Maritain referred to as) “different methods of 
application,”34 the Church bids them preserve their munus of 
serving the poor through education.  This is the task that is 
properly their own, from their Founder and from the universal 
Church.  Vatican II adds that, in reforming their approach to 
their respective munera, the active orders and institutes must 
continue to be missionary in vision and aims: 
 Institutes should faithfully maintain and accomplish the tasks 
that are theirs . . . .  The missionary spirit must, absolutely, be 
aid of them, we can join with the Lasallians in discerning the place of, and making 
way for, the Lasallian schools of the future. As the Lasallians plumb St. La Salle’s 
spiritual patrimony for what it can speak to us today, we can assist by meeting them 
in dialogue about this world of ours that needs the Lasallian contribution. Cf. VAN 
GRIEKEN, supra note 28, at 13–21. 
32 BERNARD LONERGAN, Dimensions of Meaning, in 4 COLLECTION: COLLECTED 
WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 245 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., 
1988). 
33 VATICAN II, DECREE ON THE UP-TO-DATE RENEWAL OF RELIGIOUS LIFE: 
PERFECTAE CARITATIS ¶ 2 (Oct. 28, 1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE 
CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 611, 612 (Austin Flannery ed., 1998) 
(1975) [hereinafter PERFECTAE CARITATIS]. 
34 Maritain, supra note 27. 
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preserved in religious institutes and must be adapted to modern 
conditions, in keeping with the character of each, so that the 
preaching of the Gospel to all nations may be more effective.35
This is the renewal—the “genuine spiritual faithfulness”—to 
which the Church calls that part of herself that is the Institute of 
the Brothers of Christian Schools. 
Genuine spiritual faithfulness will require, furthermore, 
fidelity to LaSalle’s particular conception of the purpose of 
education.  For Lasallians the quotidian deeds of education have 
the eternal salvation of the pupils as their final cause. 
 God wills not only that all come to the knowledge of the truth 
but also that all be saved . . . .  He cannot truly desire this end 
without providing the means for it and, therefore, without 
giving children teachers who will assist them in the fulfillment 
of this plan. . . .   
 Therefore, you must honor your ministry and keep trying to 
save some of these children.36
The quoted language comes from La Salle’s Meditations for 
the Time of Retreat, and the scriptural text on which he is 
meditating is, of course, I Timothy 2:4:  “God desires that all men 
be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth.”37  Hans Urs von 
Balthasar and others have wondered whether we can dare hope 
that all humans be saved.38  John Baptist de la Salle made God’s 
expressed desire that all his children be saved and come to 
knowledge of the truth a principle of action, the precept of a new 
ministry. 
Some today warm to Lasallians for their historical 
commitment to serve the poor, and would edit out those elements 
of the Saint’s work that concern salvation and coming to 
knowledge of the truth.  Much of the crusade to relativize 
“Christian education” cathects the moral need to respect the 
individual conscience.  Such unbalanced focus on “the right to 
liberty of conscience” can obscure the fact that the authentic 
right springs, as the Second Vatican Council taught in the 
Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae) from the 
universal human duty “to seek the truth, especially religious 
35 PERFECTAE CARITATIS, supra note 33, ¶ 20. 
36 JOHN BAPTIST DE LA SALLE: THE SPIRITUALITY OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 39 
(Carl Koch et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter KOCH]. 
37 I Timothy 2:4. 
38 See generally HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, DARE WE HOPE “THAT ALL MEN BE 
SAVED?”, (David Kipp & Lothar Krauth eds., 1988). 
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truth,” and that, furthermore, “[all people] are also bound to 
adhere to the truth once they come to know it and direct their 
whole lives in accordance with the demands of truth.”39  No one 
today can say in the name of the Church that anyone should be 
forced to embrace the Catholic faith in violation of his own 
conscience.  Correlatively, Catholics must affirm that no effort 
can be spared in helping people freely to inform their conscience 
according to that truth in which salvation lies.  The work 
initiated by La Salle simply loses its raison d’etre if the exigence 
to bring children to salvation and knowledge of the truth is 
overlooked or, God forbid, denied. 
La Salle conceived of this work of the Brothers—bringing 
children to salvation and knowledge of the truth--as exactly what 
he called it: ministry.  Though himself a priest, La Salle founded 
a lay movement.  Like members of most other modern orders and 
institutes, the Brothers take vows of poverty, chastity, and 
obedience, but they are not called to Holy Orders.  All members 
of La Salle’s Institute pursue a properly lay ministry, rather than 
a sacramental ministry.  In the words of one contemporary 
scholar, Brother Michael McGinnis, F.S.C.:  
 “[La Salle’s] determined insistence on the lay character of the 
society did not emerge from an a priori position about the 
relationships of clergy and laity (such a one could develop in 
contemporary theology and practice) but rather from pursuing 
particular commitments to which the events of his life had 
directed him.”40   
Those commitments included serving the neglected poor through 
education.  Education, as conceived of by the Saint, however, was 
not the classical education of—say—the Ratio Studiorum, nor 
was it, as we post-moderns might imagine, about getting 
“information” across to incipient utility-maximizers.  La Salle 
was conspicuously concerned about developing practical skills in 
the Brothers’ disciples (as the Saint liked to refer to their pupils), 
about teaching those disciples manners and modes of conduct 
and deportment in a way that would call their own human 
dignity to their attention, and about their disciples’ learning 
39 See generally VATICAN II, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: DIGNITATIS 
HUMANAE ¶ 2 (Dec. 7, 1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 33, at 
799–800 [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ]. 
40  KOCH, supra note 36, at 248 n.34 (quoting MICHAEL MCGINNIS, F.S.C., 
Church, in LASALLIAN THEMES 83, 90 (1992)).  
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what they needed to know to get along well in the world.  To the 
mind of La Salle, however, the Brothers’ work was emphatically 
not social work but ministry.  La Salle and his Brothers rose 
early and labored late from a devout desire to see that as many 
as possible might be saved and come to knowledge of the truth.  
The following are the terms in which La Salle understood the 
Brothers’ work in the Church: 
[Y]ou must honor your ministry and keep trying to save some of 
these children.  (Rom. 11:13-14).  Because God has made you his 
ministers to reconcile them to him, according to the expression 
of the same apostle, and has entrusted you for this purpose with 
the word of reconciliation for them, exhort them as if God were 
urging them through you, for you have been destined to 
cultivate these young plants (Ps 128:3, 144:12) by announcing 
the truths of the gospel to them (2 Cor 5:18-20) and to procure 
for them the means of salvation appropriate to their 
development.41
 
 God has had the goodness to remedy [the misfortune of 
children in abject poverty and neglect] by the establishment of 
the Christian Schools, where the teaching is offered free of 
charge and entirely for the glory of God, where the children are 
kept all day to learn reading, writing, and their religion, and 
where they are always busy, so that when their parents want 
them to go to work, they are ready for employment.42
La Salle clarified and assured the dignity of the work of 
serving the poor through education and thereby contributed to 
their salvation, because he never confused or conflated 
sacramental ministry and the ministry to be performed by his 
Brothers. 
The writings in which La Salle refers to this saving work of 
the Brothers as “ministry” were considered spirituality and not 
theology, and therefore they were not scrutinized for their 
orthodoxy in connection with his canonization in 1900.43  But it 
would be a mistake to elide the Saint’s teaching about ministry, 
even if out of a healthy fear of avoiding the wrong side of today’s 
debates about what is and what is not “ministry” in the Church.44  
41 See KOCH, supra note 36, at 39. 
42 See id. at 40. 
43 See id. at 27 (citing MCGINNIS, supra note 40, at 89). 
44 See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CO-WORKERS 
IN THE VINEYARD OF THE LORD 5 (2005) (offering a “pastoral and theological 
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What stands out for our contemporary edification is La Salle’s 
insight that the work of basic education—not just the critical task 
of catechesis—is part of the ministerial work of the whole Church, 
pursued especially on behalf of the poor by the Institute he 
founded for that purpose.  “How you ought to consider yourselves 
honored,” said La Salle to his Brothers, “by the Church, to be 
called by her to a work so holy and so lofty and for which she has 
chosen you to procure for children a knowledge of our religion 
and of the spirit of Christianity.”45  Though La Salle was 
ingenuous and firm in his insistence that the Brothers be loyal in 
their submission to the pastors of the Church46, and thus in his 
insistence that the Brothers be lay ministers of the Church, it is 
also clear that, as Brother Michael McGinnis explains, for La 
Salle 
The ministry which the Brothers exercise on behalf of poor 
children is actually a participation in the saving work of God, 
whose will to save all humankind became incarnated in the life 
and ministry of Jesus.  Just as Jesus revealed the way the way 
to God, so too the Brothers reveal the way to union with God 
through the instruction of their students, as ‘ministers of God 
and dispensers of his mysteries’.  This participation in the 
saving work of God and Christ is accomplished in and through 
the education, both expressly religious and secular, of the 
children, not in some separate religious dimension of life.47
When the Lasallians are striving to satisfy the rights of the 
child, including the poor child, to education, they are doing the 
work of the Church.  This is the spiritual heritage that comes 
down to us in the Church from St. La Salle, who instructed his 
Brothers:  “Jesus Christ has sent you and . . . the church, whose 
ministers you are, employs you.”48  When the Lasallians cannot 
pursue their ministry or munus, it is Jesus Christ’s will that is 
frustrated—or so the Saint taught. 
For Christians, there is no higher calling, no greater 
sending, than to do the missionary work Christ entrusted to his 
disciples.  The untraditional initiative La Salle launched in 1680 
reflection on the reality of lay ecclesial ministry . . . as a synthesis of best thinking 
and practice”) 
45 See KOCH, supra note 36, at 54. 
46 See MCGINNIS, supra note 40, at 85 (discussing La Salle’s meditation for the 
Chair of Peter, On the Submission We Owe the Church). 
47 See id. at 89. 
48 See KOCH, supra note 36, at 55. 
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in the face of the abject neglect of poor children did not receive 
papal or state approval until 1725, four years after the Saint’s 
death.  Furthermore, until the codification of 1917 his Institute 
was not incorporated into Canon Law.49  Respectful though he 
was of the institutional Church and her right to govern, La Salle 
went to work for the poor—by organizing communities of 
Brothers and “the Christian Schools” without awaiting 
permission.50  Against Gallican bishops who opposed the reforms 
of the Council of Trent, La Salle stood with the Church.51  Within 
a Church that under the mandate of Trent was to raise the level 
of education of her seminarians and priests, La Salle sought to 
raise the level of education of even the poorest.  Against the 
background of Gallican political claims over the life of the 
Church, La Salle formed a society of the Church without 
awaiting royal initiative or even permission.52  La Salle would 
not have denied the right of royal or ecclesiastical authorities to 
regulate the activities of his society inasmuch as they might 
claim a share in authority touching the common good.  The 
thought that would not have occurred to La Salle is this, that the 
work of educating the poor was essentially the government’s and, 
therefore, its own to monopolize or neglect at will.  This thought 
that wouldn’t have occurred to La Salle dominates our thinking 
and deciding, leading inter alia to a systemic stifling of the 
conditions necessary to the success of the Lasallian initiative. 
II.  SOCIETIES, MUNERA, AND SUBSIDIARITY 
I turn now to sketch the principles of Catholic social thought 
that call for the creation of legal and cultural conditions different 
from those that obtain in the United States today.  The 
coordinate starting points of the Catholic position are that, first, 
society is an intrinsic perfection of the human person, and, 
second, genuine human societies have munera given by divine, 
natural, or positive (including ecclesiastical) law.  On this 
analysis, furthermore, subsidiarity is a principle, not of 
devolution, but, first, of  recognition of the respective social 
functions of given societies, and, second, of respect for and 
coordination of those societies and their munera and, as 
49 See id. at 33. 
50 See id. at 25–27, 33. 
51 See id. at 34. 
52 See id. at 8–20, 33. See generally SALM, supra note 30, passim. 
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necessary, of the provision of help to them, but only for their own 
immediate good and, mediately, for the common good.  The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, recapitulating the 
developments in magisterial teaching over the last century, 
traces munera and the complementary principle of subsidiarity to 
the human person’s participation in the divine rule: 
 God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power.  
He entrusts to every creature the functions [munera] it is 
capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own 
nature.  This mode of governance ought to be followed in social 
life.  The way God acts in governing the world, which bears 
witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire 
the wisdom of those who govern communities.  They behave as 
ministers of divine providence.53
 
 The teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of 
subsidiarity, according to which a “community of a higher order 
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of lower 
order, depriving the latter of its functions [munera], but rather 
should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its 
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a 
view to the common good.”54
On this Catholic view, in ruling himself individually through 
self-mastery, or, as concerns us here, at the level of society, 
through authority over a particular community, the human 
person is participating in the order of divine providential rule.55  
The principle of subsidiarity respects the plurality of such 
authorities, and determines the conditions under which they are 
entitled to receive aid or may be subject to regulation.  Professor 
Hittinger explains, 
The Catholic position holds that the political sovereign is 
limited by the very existence of real group persons.  A normal 
society, then, is not so much an expansion of the private so 
much as a multiplication of authorities embedded in group 
persons.  On this view, subsidiarity is not devolution—rather, it 
is a principle governing the harmony and coordination of group 
53 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1884 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
CATECHISM]. 
54 Id. ¶ 1883 (quotations omitted). 
55 Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in 
Catholic Social Doctrine, __ VILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2007). 
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persons.56
What I have just summarized, I shall now unpack. 
From the perspective of Catholic social thought, a leading 
error in modern moral and political philosophy—an error which 
leads to many other errors, to which Church teaching also 
responds—concerns man’s nature as intrinsically social.  The 
trend in modern thought is to say that the person can be, if he 
choose, supplemented—so to speak—by society.  From John 
Locke (and others) our culture inherits the idea that each of us is 
to be about his or her own privatized mission.  Although Locke 
had God assigning people their individual missions, what has 
endured of Locke’s doctrine is the idea that each of us is 
essentially autonomous, that is, on an individual mission (from 
God?).57  The Church, however, continues to teach that society is 
an intrinsic perfection of the human person.  In the words of the 
Catechism:  “The human person needs to live in society.  Society 
is not for him an extraneous addition but a requirement of his 
nature.”58  The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church 
elaborates: 
Made in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen. 1:26), and made 
visible in the universe in order to live in society (cf. Gen. 2:20, 
23) and exercise dominion over the earth (cf. Gen 1:26, 28-30), 
the human person is for this reason called from the very 
beginning to life in society:  “God did not create man as a 
‘solitary being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being’.  Social life 
therefore is not exterior to man: he can only grow and realize 
his vocation in relation with others.”59
This passage is typical of the Catholic social thought of the 
last hundred years as it links man’s essentially social perfection 
to God’s plan for human participation in the divine rule.  Man 
shares in the ruling power of God by being able to order things 
for himself and his fellows, but he does this through what Pope 
John Paul II referred to in Veritatis Splendor as a “participated 
56 Russell Hittinger, Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social 
Thought, in AFTER AUTHORITY (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed.) (forthcoming 2007) 
[hereinafter Hittinger, Society]. 
57 See MICHAEL J. WHITE, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION 147–48 (2003). 
58 CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1879. 
59 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 149 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
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theonomy.”60  Though free, and both capable of and charged with 
self-rule, human persons are always under law61—a point to 
which we shall return below. 
Intrinsically importunate of society, the human person works 
out his earthly life in all manner of associations and partnerships 
with other persons.  As I shall use it, ”society” is a technical term 
for a particular form of social unity: human unity that is not a 
merely instrumental (as, for instance, partnerships usually 
are),62 but also an intransitive human good or perfection.  We 
moderns gravitate toward the common usage according to which 
“society” is just an aggregate total of individuals; we have grown 
used to the modern idea that only individual men and women 
exist.  But, according to the Catholic mind as expressed in the 
Catechism, 
 A society is a group of persons bound together organically by a 
principle of unity that goes beyond each one of them.  As an 
assembly that is at once visible and spiritual, a society endures 
through time: it gathers up the past and prepares for the future.  
By means of society, each man is established as an ‘heir’ and 
receives certain ‘talents’ that enrich his identity and whose 
fruits he must develop.  He rightly owes loyalty to the 
communities of which he is part and respect to those in 
authority who have charge of the common good.63
The Church understands herself to be a society, one formed 
by God, rather than by mere sociological adherence.64  The 
60 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR ¶ 41.2 (1993). 
61 Russell Hittinger draws the implications of this participated theonomy, in the 
context of commenting on Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law as a participation in the 
eternal law:  
By the impression of created light God induces the creature to share in the 
rules and first measures of the eternal law. The radical implications of 
Thomas’s teaching should be evident. Every created intelligence not only 
has a competence to make judgments, but to make judgments according to 
a real law—indeed, a law that is the form and pattern of all other laws. 
Thus, the legal order of things does not begin with an acquired virtue, 
possessed by a few; nor does it begin with the offices and statutes of human 
positive law; nor does it begin with the law revealed at Sinai. God speaks 
the law, at least in its rudiments, to every intelligent creature. 
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 98 (2003). 
62 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56. 
63 CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1880. 
64 See VATICAN II, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH: LUMEN GENTIUM 
¶ 4 (Nov. 21, 1964), reprinted in THE BASIC SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 
COUNCIL II, at 1, 3 (Austin Flannery ed., 1996) (1964) [hereinafter LUMEN GENTIUM] 
(“Hence the universal church is seen to be ‘a people made one by the unity of the 
MACRO_FL_BRENNAN 11/7/2006  8:56:42 AM 
122 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:1   
 
Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools—like the 
Society of Jesus that preceded it in time—is another society, 
formed within and ordained by the Church, and thus possessed of 
a right to exist (unless and until suppressed by the Church 
because of its failure to achieve its munus).  The family is still 
another society, formed by a man and a woman, and first 
ordained by God.  This society also has a right to exist and to be 
recognized.65  Schools, too, can be societies in their own right, for 
they are—or can be—“group[s] of persons bound together 
organically by a principle of unity that goes beyond each one of 
them,”66 gathering up the past, preparing for the future, and 
enriching the identity and fruits of those who are loyal to it.  
Such societies will be subject to appropriate regulation by the 
state, in furtherance of the common good, but their right to exist 
and function is not conferred by the state. 
Before pursuing the last point, it will be helpful to develop a 
little more fully the concept of a society.  Thomas Aquinas affirms 
that there are wholes—that is, there are true unities—that are 
not the unity of an individual substantial kind; these are “unities 
of order”: 
It must be known that the whole which the political group or 
the family constitutes has only a unity of order, for it is not 
something absolutely one.  A part of this whole, therefore, can 
have an operation that is not the operation of the whole, as a 
soldier in an army has an activity that does not belong to the 
whole.  However, this whole does have an operation that is not 
proper to its parts but to the whole.67
As Johannes Messner explains, “The unity of society is 
neither a mere aggregation of self-sufficient individuals nor a 
‘formation’ organized for an external purpose.  It is,” Messner 
Father, the Son and the holy Spirit.’ ”). See generally AVERY DULLES, MODELS OF 
THE CHURCH (2002); JOSEPH RATZINGER, CALLED TO COMMUNION: UNDERSTANDING 
THE CHURCH TODAY (1996). 
65 See infra pp. 130–44. 
66 CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1880. 
67 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN DECEM LIBROS ETHICORUM ARISTOTELIS AD 
NICHOMACHUM EXPOSITIO, lib. I, lec. 1, no. 5 (Marietti 1949) (“Sciendum est autem, 
quod hoc totum, quod est civilis multitude, vel domestica familia, habet solam 
unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars 
eius totius, potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in 
exercitu habet operationen quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et 
ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuis partium, sed totius, 
puta conflictus totius exercitus”). 
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continues, “a unity of order, that is, a unity in virtue of an 
immanent end coordinating the conduct of its members by means 
of their self-determination.  Order signifies unity due to an inner 
principle of form.”68  Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, the 
unity of order that constitutes a society is deserving of, as 
Maitland would later agree, the predicate “person.”  The reason 
for this predication, which refers to something that is unique by 
reason of its dignity,69 emerges from Professor Hittinger’s 
explication of what it is to enjoy a unity of order: 
Things enjoying a unity of order each possess what is 
individually proper to themselves—certain operations and acts 
not reducible to the commonality, but which flow, rather, from a 
natural or spontaneous unity of their nature—in a human 
person, sensing, thinking, judging, willing, and so forth.  These 
natural properties are not dissolved or cancelled by membership 
in a group.  At the same time, a society enjoys a real unity 
transcending mere aggregation of the members.  Wherever 
there are plural rational agents, aiming at common ends, 
through united action, and where the unity is one of the 
intrinsic goods aimed at, we have a society—something distinct 
in dignity.  To be sure, it is real—the crew team, the college, the 
city, the marriage.  But it is neither a substance nor a mere 
imputation.  A society will hold itself out to the rest of the world 
as something distinct in dignity, possessing certain rights and 
responsibilities.70
This is not just an additive cumulation of individuals, but 
unity distinct by reason of its dignity—a group person.71
The metaphysics on which all this depends, as more than a 
mere imputation, is not commonly embraced today, but it would 
be a disservice to imagine that it has been limited to the Catholic 
tradition.  Re-enter Maitland: 
When . . . a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred 
68 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
117–18 (J.J. Doherty trans., 3d ed. 1965). 
69 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at __ (discussing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I, Q. 29, art. 3, at 31 (forthcoming) [hereinafter SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE]). 
70 Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 2. Not every thing that enjoys a “unity of 
order” is a society of which “person” can be predicated. See id. (quoting SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 69, Q. 47, art. 3, at 261–62). 
71 See, e.g., MESSNER, supra note 68, at 127–29 (discussing man as both 
individual and social with respect to the function and goal of society in service to the 
common good). 
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thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular 
way for some common purpose, they create a body, which by no 
fiction of law, but by the very nature of things, differs from the 
individuals of whom it is constituted. . . .   
. . . 
. . . If the law allows men to form permanently organized 
groups, those groups will be for common opinion right-and-duty-
bearing units; and if the law-giver will not openly treat them as 
such, he will misrepresent, or as the French say, he will 
‘denature’ the facts . . . .  For the morality of common sense the 
group is person, is right-and-duty- bearing unit.72
To acknowledge the additive total of the individuals but deny 
the existence of the unity of order that is a group person would be 
to deny the society.  Again Maitland: 
Let the moral philosopher explain this, let him explain it as 
illusion, let him explain it away; but he ought not to leave it 
unexplained, nor, I think, will he be able to say that it is an 
illusion which is losing power, for, on the contrary, it seems to 
me to be persistently and progressively triumphing over certain 
philosophical and theological prejudices.73
One response to some people’s affirmation of society as a true 
unity of order—a group person—is to deny it, as Margaret 
Thatcher did.74  Another is to follow a variation on one of the 
courses adumbrated by Maitland:  The state can claim exclusive 
power over whether a society can be created and, if created 
without concession of the state, whether it is to be granted 
recognition by the state.  The latter course is where the action 
has unfolded in the modern period.  With the (gaping) exception 
of the unborn, the modern state has not denied the right of 
individuals to exist.  It has been the modern trend, however, for 
the state to deny that societies have a right to exist (unless and 
until the state grant such a revocable right).  Take an example 
adduced by Maitland:  “It issues in the famous declaration of 
August 18, 1792:  ‘A State that is truly free ought not to suffer 
within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being 
dedicated to public instruction, have merited well of the 
72 MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 63, 68 (quotations omitted); see also Hittinger, 
Society, supra note 56, at 2. 
73 MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 68. On the history of theorizing about “group 
personality” in modern political thought, see DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE 
PERSONALITY OF THE STATE (1997). 
74 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 1. 
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country.’ ”75  Take another example from France, this one 
adduced by Hittinger.  The Third French Republic claimed a 
comprehensive right over societies, in this case religious 
societies, when in 1901 it declared by legislation:  “No religious 
congregation may be formed without an authorization given by 
law that determines the conditions of its exercise . . . .  The 
dissolution of a congregation or the closing of any establishment 
may be declared by a cabinet decree.”76  As it happens, Rousseau 
had already gone several steps further when he insisted:  It is 
“important that there should be no partial society in the state.”77  
It has just this sort of totalizing claim that the Church has been 
sure to counter, reminding the world that societies both exist 
and, sometimes, exist by right that precedes the state and its 
law. 
Which brings us back to the question of munus.  Just as, 
according to the philosophia perennis, part of what constitutes a 
substantial person is his possession of a function, so too, 
according to Catholic social thought, part of what makes a society 
what it is, is its possession of a munus.  Professor Hittinger has 
traced the consolidation of the Church’s teaching on munera, and 
it would be otiose to repeat that history.78  The substantive claim 
of import here is that part of what it is to be a society is to have a 
munus, which is a determinate share in ruling power.  Munera 
are determined sometimes primarily by divine law, as in the case 
of the Church and the family; sometimes primarily by 
ecclesiastical law, as in the case of the Christian Brothers; 
sometimes primarily by civil law, as in the case of, say, 
corporations.  I say “primarily,” because in most of the 
aforementioned cases there may be multiple determinations.  For 
example, marriage is a society ordained by both natural law and 
divine positive law; the state is ordained by nature but 
determined by human positive law. 
If we are not totally unaccustomed to the idea that certain 
societies have their particular rights, it was the contribution of 
Pius XI, according to Professor Hittinger, “to make clear that 
[such] rights are not derived from human nature abstractly 
75 MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 66. 
76 Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 7 n.24. 
77 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 32 (Donald A. Cress, 
trans., 1983). 
78 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8. 
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considered, but rather from human nature as already bearing 
(implicitly or explicitly) social munera.”79  Before we can 
understand the rights and immunities, we must know what they 
protect; before we can do justice in society, we need to know 
where the munera have already been assigned.  Thus, as 
Hittinger explains, 
[W]hen the political authority recognizes and helps to 
coordinate the social roles and vocations, it is not in the first 
place a question of distributive justice; for the magistrate does 
not distribute the munera which have been assigned by creation 
and redemption; rather, by recognizing these munera (including 
the function of the state itself), the magistrate is recognizing a 
legal justice that neither begins nor terminates in the state.80
With respect to the munera that are distributed by creation 
and redemption, their bearers are already existentially poised to 
give the gift of the office, and when the state comes to consider 
questions of social justice, it confronts a world in which certain 
munera are already in operation and contributing to the common 
good.81  Munera that are distributed solely by positive law 
dispose individuals and societies to action through their 
reception, but the magistrate distributing such munera (e.g., the 
judicial office) does so against the background of a world in which 
human individuals and societies are already, through their 
respective munera, participating in the divine rule. 
The point is that the state and its magistrate never did 
possess plenary ruling power in the first place—though this is 
exactly what subsidiarity, as commonly discussed, presupposes, 
to wit, that power should devolve from the top to the smallest 
unit that can get the job done effectively.  Within a world packed 
with munera already in action or poised to act, subsidiarity is the 
principle that (1) munera conferred by creation and redemption 
are to be respected and (2) positive law is to be used to facilitate 
and harmonize the aforementioned munera and to confer only 
those additional munera that are either consistent with or of 
assistance to those that precede positive law.  As Hittinger 
79 Id. at 58. 
80 Id. at 58–59. 
81 For an analysis of the relationship between ecclesial munera and the 
conditions of their exercise, see LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 64, in SACROSANCTUM 
OECUMENICUM VATICANUM II, CONSTITUTIONES, DECRETA, DECLARATIONES 215–19 
(1993); see also Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59–60. 
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explains, 
[S]ubsidiarity cannot create a social ontology, and it would be 
useless or even destructive to make subsidiarity do that kind of 
work.  Any application of the principle of subsidiarity ahead of 
the distribution of offices and powers is to put the cart before 
the horse.  For the question of just relations between social 
offices and institutions presupposes the existence of these social 
forms, each having its own esse proprium.  And where the 
nature and scope of these social forms is in doubt, subsidiarity 
remains a principle without matter.82
Every society possessed of its own proper being is, if it is 
functioning as it ought, a locus of genuine authority.  It is not by 
concession of the state that plural authorities exist; plural 
authorities are the natural state of affairs, which totalizing 
governments denature and destroy.  Again, this natural 
pluralism is not a lawless state: every genuine society is such 
because it possesses a munus, and this is a participation in the 
divine governance.  Properly functioning families, churches, and 
schools are participants in the divine rule.  Every society is thus 
under law; its genuine authority is a function of its possession of 
genuine, lawful ruling power.  It falls to the state, then, as the 
instrument of civil society, to coordinate the interaction of plural 
societies, with their respective munera, for the common good.  
What Pope Leo XIII said regarding the state and workers’ rights 
to band together in associations also applies mutatis mutandis to 
the state’s relationship to the plurality of genuine societies: 
Private societies, then, although they exist within the body 
politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot 
nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public 
authority.  For, to enter into a “society” of this kind is the 
natural right of man; and the [civitas] has for its office to 
protect natural rights, not to destroy them. . . . 
. . . 
. . . The State should watch over these societies of citizens 
banded together in accordance with their rights, but it should 
not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their 
organization, for things move and live by the spirit inspiring 
them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from 
without.83
82 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 60–61. 
83 LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOVARUM ¶¶ 51, 55 (1891). 
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I have lingered over the right of non-state-created societies 
to exist and be recognized because, unless and until we are 
poised to assert this right, too often, as history reveals, the state 
will find it expedient to ignore or deny the right.  Frequently, 
however, it is not enough for the state merely to recognize the 
societies that it does not create; sometimes such societies need 
help.  To “watch over,”84 as Leo says, will sometimes mean to 
assist.  In the root sense of subsidium, subsidiarity refers to help 
or aid, as in the English ”subsidy.”  But this is not all there is 
to—indeed, this is not the core of—subsidiarity as understood in 
Catholic social thought, Hittinger explains, developing the 
historical work of the nineteenth century Jesuit Luigi Taparelli 
that influenced Popes: 
[S]ubsidiarity evokes the concept of auxiliary troops in the 
Roman legion which sat below’ [sub sedeo], ready and duty-
bound to render service.  Hence, it describes the right. . . of 
social groups, each enjoying its own proper mode of action.  
While sometimes identified with the word subsidium (help, 
assistance), the point of subsidiarity is a normative structure of 
plural social forms, not a trickling down of power or aid. . . .  
[S]ocial justice is that kind of order that ensues when each 
person is capacitated to ‘exercise his social munus,” to 
contribute to the common good according to his proper office and 
role.  This may or may not require the giving of aid, the 
correction of a deficiency, or the removal of barriers to the 
performance of social duties, but what it always entails is 
respect for a pluriform social order.85
Johannes Messner brings into focus the true nature of 
subsidiarity by avoiding the common expression “the principle of 
subsidiarity,” preferring instead the locution “the principle of 
subsidiary function.”86  Subsidiarity and function/munus travel 
84 Id. ¶ 55. 
85 Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in I THE TEACHINGS 
OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 3, 23 (John Witte 
Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., 2006) (quoting PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVINI 
REDEMPTORIS ¶ 32 (1937) [hereinafter DIVINI REDEMPTORIS] ); see also Thomas C. 
Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J. (1793–1862) and the Development of Scholastic 
Natural-Law Thought as a Science of Society and Politics, 6 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 
99, 105 (2003); THOMAS BEHR, LUIGI TAPARELLI AND THE 19TH CENTURY NEO-
THOMISTIC “REVOLUTION” IN NATURAL LAW AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 22–38 
(2000) (Ph.D dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo); MESSNER, supra 
note 68, at 212. 
86 MESSNER, supra note 68, at 212. 
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together.  “[S]ubsidiarity . . . is a principle derivative from social 
justice: namely, that when subsidium be given either by the 
parts to the whole or the whole to the parts the plurality of 
functions or munera should not be destroyed or absorbed.”87  The 
governmental instrument that we refer to as the state exists to 
serve the plural societies that co-exist with and within it, with a 
view toward the common good.  According to Pope Pius XI, in 
Divini Redemptoris, “the genuine and chief [munus] of public and 
civil authority consists precisely in the efficacious furthering of 
this harmony and coordination of all social forces,”88 which, as 
the Pope observes, includes genuine societies.  The goal is to 
“fuse[] [them] into a harmonious unity inspired by the principle 
of the common good.”89
It may be that the society that is the Church will, for her 
part, ordinarily do her work best without the aid of the state.  
Other societies, however, and particularly the family, will 
frequently need the assistance of the state, but from this it does 
not follow that there is a deficiency on the part of the family: 
[S]ubsidiarity does not per se imply a deficiency in the person or 
office receiving the subsidium.  The family receives help from 
the wider political community, but that does not mean that the 
family is itself “deficient”—rather it means that the family’s 
unique munus does not constitute the entirety of the common 
good, and it is entirely natural for the family to rely upon 
institutions other than itself . . . .  [S]ometimes there really is a 
deficiency.  A family, for example, can come apart at the seams, 
and another power has to intervene to assist. . . .  Subsidiarity 
in this kind of case demands that the intervention have as its 
goal the restoration rather than the absorption or elimination of 
the function, mission, role of the institution being assisted.90
Subsidiarity is an expression of pluralism, a principle of non-
absorption of one function by another.  Further, as a principle for 
harmonizing the plural social authorities and of providing aid as 
necessary, it governs the interaction of all human societies, 
including family and Church, toward the common good.  In sum: 
[T]he principle of subsidiary function, as a principle delimiting 
87 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59. 
88 DIVINI REDEMPTORIS, supra note 85, ¶ 32. 
89 Id. 
90 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59–60; see also J. Verstraeten, 
Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 133, 
135–36 (David Boileau ed., 1994). 
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social competencies, is an ontological principle, and because it 
belongs to the ontological order of the common good itself, it is 
not less an ontological principle than is the common good 
principle: like the common good principle, it has its origin in the 
unity of man’s personal and social nature, and its substance is 
determined by the order of ends indicated thereby . . . . 
 . . .  
 . . . The principle of subsidiary function stands opposed to the 
omnipotence of organizations just as it is opposed to the 
omnipotence of the state.  Because the subsidiary function 
principle protects the particular rights of the natural and the 
free associations against the state’s claim to omnicompetence, it 
is a fundamental principle of the pluralistic society: the 
subsidiary principle stands against the totalitarian claim of the 
state to competence; the subsidiary principle is the natural 
fundamental law of the free society, guaranteeing the particular 
rights of “society” as distinct from the state.91  
Subsidiarity is not a mandate for either devolution or a 
government handout; subsidiarity highlights obligation: 
[T]he principle of subsidiary function also confers an 
obligation . . . on the member societies and individuals, since it 
protects their own competencies and rights.  Nothing is gained 
by merely appealing to the subsidiary function principle in reply 
to the state’s tendency to expand.  The competencies and rights 
protected by the subsidiary function principle must be used with 
vigor; the responsibilities underlying them as far as possible 
must be fulfilled through one’s own power and initiative.92
With these structural principles in mind, I turn now to the 
specific societies—the specific group persons—that are my 
present concern. 
III.  CHURCHES, SCHOOLS, FAMILIES: SUBSIDIARITY IN ACTION 
The work of the society that is the Church might sometimes 
benefit, as a matter of fact, from aid from the state; the works of 
the distinct societies ordained within the Church might 
sometimes benefit from, if not outright need (if they are to 
succeed), the affirmative assistance of the state.  In abjuring all 
privileges for herself, as she does today, the Church by no means 
denies the liceity of her receiving, on her own terms, aid from the 
state.  In the words of the Second Vatican Council in Dignitatis 
91 MESSNER, supra note 68, at 210, 213. 
92 Id. at 213. 
MACRO_FL_BRENNAN 11/7/2006  8:56:42 AM 
2006] HARMONIZING PLURAL SOCIETIES 131 
 
humanae: 
The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle 
governing relations between the Church and public authorities 
and the whole civil order. . . .   
. . .  
. . . The Church also claims freedom for herself as a society of 
men with the right to live in civil society in accordance with the 
demands of the Christian faith.93
Certainly, this claim concerns the negative liberty of the 
Church, but the Church also claims a positive right against the 
state to have enacted into law and put into practice at least some 
of the conditions necessary to the Church’s fulfilling her mission: 
 When the principle of religious freedom is not just proclaimed 
in words or incorporated in law but is implemented sincerely in 
practice, only then does the Church enjoy in law and in fact 
those stable conditions which give her the independence 
necessary for fulfilling her divine mission.94
We need not linger over which positive conditions are to be 
satisfied first, however, because, of course, the U.S. Constitution 
as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court holds it lawful for 
the state purposely or directly to aid religion.  If, for example, the 
legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed a 
statute appropriating funds directly to the Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools (along with a dozen other 
Christian and non-Christians religious societies), it would violate 
the Constitution as it is currently interpreted.  The principle of 
subsidiarity, which precedes the Constitution, is thus rendered 
powerless to do its work.  We can doubt whether ours is the 
regime the Framers of the First Amendment sought and 
anticipated, but it remains the dispensation within which we are 
given to live—except, perhaps, in moments of legitimate advocacy 
for a better interpretation of the Framers’ Constitution. 
We can continue to complain that the state is failing to meet 
its obligations to the Church, but more promising today is the 
complaint that the state is failing in its obligation under 
subsidiarity to help the family fulfill its function.  It is the 
mission of the family to be the primary educator of its children, 
but many families will fail in that munus without help.  Such 
failure is the predictable outcome of a regime that pits (all but 
93 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶ 13. 
94 Id. 
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rich) children against the state.  A collateral consequence of this 
failure is, of course, a frustration of the Church’s own work to 
cooperate with parents in bringing children to salvation.  The 
constitutionally cognizable claim, however, is that parents have a 
right that is not being honored, to wit, the (limited) right to direct 
the education and upbringing of children in their charge.  That 
right is cognizable as part of our current constitutional regime, 
thanks to Pierce, about which I shall have more to say below. 
Catholic teaching on the function of the family is sufficiently 
well-known that it will suffice here, starting from that munus, to 
summarize the Catholic argument, first, against the current 
individual-versus-state educational apparatus and, second, in 
favor of a family-centered and subsidiarity-structured system of 
education (in which the Church, too, will have an opportunity to 
fulfill her munus vis-à-vis children).  Though the Church’s 
teaching begins from the respective munera of various societies, 
the reader will observe that, for purposes of making claims for 
positive protection and help, munera are sometimes translated 
into the idiom of rights-and-duties.  But make no mistake:  At 
root, what is at issue are plural and particular shares in the 
divine ruling power, nothing less. 
The family is a distinct society, with its own function, its own 
corresponding duties and rights. 
The family, the natural community in which human social 
nature is experienced, makes a unique and irreplaceable 
contribution to the good of society.  The family unit, in fact, is 
born from the communion of persons.  “ ‘Communion’ has to 
with the personal relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘thou.’  
‘Community’ on the other hand transcends this framework and 
moves towards a ‘society,’ a ‘we.’  The family, as a community of 
persons, is the first human ‘society.’ ” 
. . . 
The priority of the family over society and over the State must be 
affirmed.  The family in fact, at least in its procreative function, 
is the condition itself for their existence.  With regard to other 
functions that benefit each of its members, it . . . [precedes] in 
importance and value the functions that society and the State 
are called to perform.  The family possesses inviolable rights 
and finds its legitimization in human nature and not in being 
recognized by the State.  The family, then, does not exist for 
society or for the State, but society and the State exist for the 
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family.95
 Parents hold the duty and therefore the right to be the primary 
educators of their children. 
The right and duty of parents to educate their children is 
essential, since it is connected with the transmission of human 
life; it is original and primary with regard to the educational 
role of others, on account of the uniqueness of the loving 
relationship between parents and children; and it is 
irreplaceable and inalienable, and therefore incapable of being 
entirely delegated to others or usurped by others.96
Parents have a duty and right to give their children, and 
children have a right to receive, education that conforms to the 
parents’ religious convictions. 
Parents are the first educators, not the only educators, of their 
children.  It belongs to them, therefore, to exercise with 
responsibility their educational activity in close and vigilant 
cooperation with civil and ecclesial agencies. . . . Parents have 
the right to choose the formative tools that respond to their 
convictions and to seek those means that will help them best to 
fulfil[l] their duty as educators, in the spiritual and religious 
sphere also. 97
The state is under a duty to respect parents as the primary 
educators of children and, observing the principles of distributive 
justice, to assist parents as needed. 
The civil authority must . . . recognize the right of parents to 
choose with genuine freedom schools or other means of 
education.  Parents should not be subjected directly or indirectly 
to unjust burdens because of this freedom of choice.98
 
 Public authorities have the duty to guarantee this right [of 
parents to be the primary educators of their children] and to 
ensure the concrete conditions necessary for it to be exercised.99
 
 Parents, who have a primary and inalienable duty and right in 
regard to the education of their children, should enjoy the 
fullest liberty in their choice of school.  The public authority, 
therefore, whose duty it is to protect and defend the liberty of 
95 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at ¶¶ 213–14. 
96 Id. ¶ 239. 
97 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 240. 
98 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶ 5. 
99 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 240. 
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the citizens, is bound according to the principles of distributive 
justice to ensure that public subsidies to schools are so allocated 
that parents are truly free to select schools for their children in 
accordance with their conscience.100
The refusal to provide public economic support to non-public 
schools that need assistance and that render a service to civil 
society is to be considered an injustice.  “Whenever the State lays 
claim to an educational monopoly, it oversteps its rights and 
offends justice. . . . The State cannot without injustice merely 
tolerate so-called private schools.  Such schools render a public 
service and therefore have a right to financial assistance.”101
The state is obligated under the correlative principle of 
subsidiarity, which has both positive and negative dimensions, to 
come to the aid of societies in need: 
Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, 
institutional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social 
entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implications 
that require the State to refrain from anything that would de 
facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells 
of society.  Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not 
be supplanted.102
 
 In their relationship to the family, society and the State are 
seriously obligated to observe the principle of subsidiarity.  In 
virtue of this principle, public authorities may not take away 
from the family tasks which it can accomplish well by itself or in 
free association with other families; on the other hand, these 
same authorities have the duty to sustain the family, ensuring 
that it has all the assistance that it needs to fulfil[l] properly its 
responsibilities.103
 
This line of reasoning will be well-nigh incomprehensible to 
those who suppose that education is intrinsically the work of the 
state and that, when non-state actors are permitted to 
administer schools, we witness no more than the state’s opting to 
outsource what remains essentially its own work.  But if we 
100 VATICAN COUNCIL II, DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 
GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS ¶ 6 (1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 
33, at 731 [hereinafter GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS]. 
101 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 241. 
102 Id. ¶ 186. 
103 Id. ¶ 214. 
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start, as the Church teaches us to start, by recognizing the 
existence of plural societies, their respective munera, and 
subsidiarity understood as an ontological principle of plural 
social forms and a duty of non-usurping assistance.  Then, if we 
come to children within this context of the divinely ordained 
societies that are Church and family, we will be in the position to 
specify and respect the place of religious schools in the overall 
mix and motion of civil society as a whole.  Such societies as 
schools are not mere concessions of the state; they belong, as a 
natural right, though subject to regulation on behalf of the 
common good, to those who wish to create and administer them 
in fulfillment of their respective munera. 
The reason that schools may be subject to regulation is, 
again, that the schools’ efforts do not exhaust the conditions 
necessary to achievement of the common good of all.  The state’s 
particular function is the one of realizing the truly common good 
of civil society, and it will do so in part by respecting and, as 
necessary, regulating and coordinating the efforts of the plural 
societies that both precede it and co-exist within it. 
The principle of subsidiarity is what brings the functions of the 
state into the perspective of the actual common good.  This is 
characterized by the fact that the political community is an 
association of individual and social persons with their own 
existential ends and their corresponding tasks, rights, and 
powers, who can reach their essential self-fulfillment only by 
complying with the corresponding responsibilities implied in 
these ends.  The state is the institution for coordinating these 
powers and activities for the good of all.104
If the Church could stick to her spiritual knitting, she would 
thereby reduce the occasions and opportunities for governmental 
regulation of her ecclesial munera; under our constitutional 
dispensation, secure is the freedom to believe in what one wishes 
in his condominium.  But the Church’s munus includes concrete 
actions in the world, and through her works in fulfillment of her 
munus, the Church invites occasions for regulation in view of the 
common good.  Those who care about the success and integrity of 
the Church’s activities are right to worry lest the “strings” that 
come attached to benefits received from government bind the 
hands of the Church and frustrate her mission.105  But the 
104 MESSNER, supra note 68, at 630. 
105 Cf. Vischer, Principle of Governance, supra note 6, at 115 (“[R]easonable 
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ontological principle of subsidiarity denies that plural societies 
should be autonomous societies.  Over their long history, 
Lasallian schools have been the beneficiaries and dis-
beneficiaries of countless regimes.  When the conditions a 
particular regime imposes would vitiate the Lasallian work, 
Lasallians are free to close up shop, as it were, and pursue their 
munera elsewhere.  It is no secret that the Church is finding 
more fertile mission territories than, say, Greenwich, CT, or Palo 
Alto, CA.  The question I am pursuing here is what those who 
care about children, families, the Church, and the Lasallians in 
particular should pursue today in the United States.  Again, 
munera and the principle of subsidiarity put these societies—
these group persons—under an obligation to do their respective 
tasks “with vigor.” 
IV.  SERIOUSLY? 
Obviously enough, though I have yet to make the point 
explicit, my normative argument tends toward a proximate 
appeal to expand “school choice.”  The Constitution is for the 
moment interpreted to allow the state to provide some indirect 
assistance to religious schools, so long as it does so in a way that 
is neutral with respect to religion.106  The rule of Zelman respects 
and begins to give concrete effect to the principle of Pierce, 
according to which our Constitution guarantees the “liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children.”107  In the view of the Pierce Court, “The child is not the 
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations.”108  Pierce was 
decided on substantive due process, not First Amendment, 
minds differ as to the precise contours of the line between government and market-
based solutions to social problems . . . .”). 
106 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (“In sum, the Ohio 
program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a 
wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a 
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice 
among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a 
program of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions 
rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend 
the Establishment Clause.”). 
107 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
108 Id. at 535. 
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grounds, and it may well be that our Supreme Court has “yet to 
come up with a good theory to explain its holding in Pierce.”109  
But if the Court is still in search of a theory as it goes forward 
giving effect to Pierce (as it did in Zelman), Catholics are already 
possessed of a theory that gives them reason, as Richard Garnett 
says, “to take Pierce seriously.”110  And if, with Professor Garnett, 
we do take Pierce seriously, and for the reasons I have been 
developing, 
[W]e should then say that state functionaries, guided and 
restrained by a proper humility about their authority and 
competence, should meddle with parents’ educational decisions 
only to prevent harm, very carefully defined, to a child.  That is, 
they should not intervene simply whenever they think intrusion 
or oversight would serve the Government’s notion of the child’s 
‘best interests’ or its own perceived need and claimed 
prerogative to create a certain kind of citizen.111
Professor Garnett continues immediately thereafter in a 
footnote: 
In my view, government ‘intervention’ in the family is 
intervention. [James Dwyer takes a different view:] “[T]he 
reality is that the family is not a separate, primordial sphere 
that is or can be cordoned off from the power of the state.  Quite 
the opposite.  The law creates the family, and things could not 
be otherwise . . . .”  But this is not ‘the reality.’  The law no more 
‘creates’ the family than the Rule Against Perpetuities ‘creates’ 
dirt.112
Catholics should find it easy to, and they should be hopeful 
that legislators and the Court will, take Pierce seriously.  The 
future of the Lasallian munus in the U.S., to say nothing of the 
fate of countless non-rich families and their children, would seem 
to depend upon it, or at least on the expansion of “school choice.” 
For some three decades, the combined voice of Professors 
John Coons and Steven Sugarman has commended “school 
choice” to us on quite plausible grounds.  Coons and Sugarman 
argue that parents should be enabled to choose their children’s 
109 Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious 
Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 112 n.21 (2000). 
110 Id. at 114. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 114 n.29 (quoting James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to 
Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 147, 167 (2000)). 
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schools because they ordinarily know their children better than 
anyone else, ordinarily care about their children more than 
anyone else, and are accountable for their children as is no one 
else.113  In its elaborated forms, this argument has been one of 
the prime movers in the movement that has begun to turn 
people’s attention to the exigence of school choice.  If we have 
reason to be grateful for this development, we should at least be 
wary of the underside of the argument from the utility of 
parental choice.  “The state” is all too happy to calculate utility 
and ensure that it is maximized according to principles of its own 
choosing.  For Catholics, however, the reason for making the 
state responsible to families is not any assessment of utility or 
calculation of consequences; it is, rather, that the society that is 
the family is intransitively “the first and vital cell of society.”114  
Its munus is given.  If it happens that a particular family cannot 
perform its function, subsidiarity will require aid to that family, 
with a view toward restoring it, if possible, to proper functioning. 
Furthermore, for the reasons developed above, it is no 
argument for centralizing state control that the ordinary state of 
affairs will require aid to the family.  The family’s munus does 
not exhaust the common good, and it is the ratio essendi of the 
state to coordinate and assist primary societies with a view 
toward their own respective goods and toward the common good 
of all.115  Again, the right of the family to perform its essential 
function is in no way the contingent product of a predictive 
calculation of its wisdom or practicality, nor is it attenuated or 
vitiated by its need for help.  As Professor Garnett suggests, 
113 See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: 
THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 52–61 (1978); JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. 
SUGARMAN, MAKING SCHOOL CHOICE WORK FOR ALL FAMILIES subdiv. I (1999), 
available at 
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/educat/making_choice/main2.html. 
114 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 211. 
115  
In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its 
peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason 
it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. 
Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all 
the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a 
perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is 
the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in 
view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds 
its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society.   
DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI, supra note 26, ¶ 12 (1929). 
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Perhaps Pierce and the cluster of values and maxims for which 
it is thought to stand are best defended not in terms of parents’ 
individual ‘rights’ against government, and certainly not in 
terms of ownership and property, but instead in terms of 
subsidiarity . . . . On this view, the State properly refrains from 
second-guessing families on matters of education and the 
transmission of religious tradition not only out of respect for the 
religious freedom and parental authority of the individuals 
situated within those families, but also out of wise regard for 
those families’ integrity and health, precisely because the 
integrity and freedom of these ‘vital cells’ is important to the 
common good.116
From where Professor Garnett leaves off I would only add, 
and I trust he would agree, that it is the antecedent munus of the 
family that calls for this result. 
In the context of the above observations about the family, 
Professor Garnett observes and approves the potentially 
“subversive” effect of societies, such as the family, that mediate 
between the state and individuals.117  Such subversion of statist 
claims occurs when the family’s insistence upon fulfillment of its 
munus (in concert, we might add, with the Church’s fulfillment of 
her own) forces itself upon the state and insinuates itself into the 
life of civil society.  Civil society and its agent, the state, are thus 
made to recognize and serve the antecedent societies and their 
respective munera.  It is the givenness of the munera that 
entitles them to respect and, if necessary, aid.  Subsidiarity does 
not assign these functions; recognizing and respecting them, it 
insists upon aid to meet societies’ given responsibilities.  We will 
be able to take Pierce seriously if we recognize that education is 
primarily (though not exclusively) the work of a group person 
that is not the creation of the state. 
“[I]f we take subsidiarity seriously,” Professor Robert Vischer 
has argued, “we will be very cautious in collectivizing our 
conception of the good.”118  For all the reasons I have been 
developing, one should want to take subsidiarity seriously.  In 
Hittinger’s phrase, it is a principle derivative of basic social 
justice; or, as Messner prefers to say, it is an ontological 
116 Garnett, supra note 109, at 144–45. 
117 Id. at 145–46. 
118 Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as Subversion: Local Power, Legal Norms, 
and the Liberal State, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 277, 309 (2005) [hereinafter 
Vischer, Subversion] (emphasis added). 
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principle.119
What, then, does Professor Vischer ask of us if we are to take 
subsidiarity seriously?  Professor Vischer is wary of a spineless 
subsidiarity: 
Standing alone, subsidiarity can be read simply as calling for 
social problems to be addressed at the local level to the extent 
local bodies can address a given problem effectively.  
Understood as a strictly political principle, the only grounds for 
dispute will be over the normative definition and empirical 
verification of effectiveness.  Beyond that, the doctrine seems so 
broadly stated as to be of nearly universal appeal.120
With this observation, I agree—but, of course, subsidiarity 
never does “stand alone,” at least it does not in the eyes of 
traditional Catholic social thought.  Professor Vischer is right to 
warn that, “shorn from its surrounding web of truth claims,” 
subsidiarity will be “vulnerabl[e] to secular domestication.”121  
But what is this surrounding web of truth claims of which 
Vischer speaks?  Does it contain munera?  Participated shares in 
the divine rule? 
On Vischer’s account, subsidiarity is “doubly subversive: 
[first,] it subverts the state’s efforts to collectivize individualist 
norms,”122 as Garnett observed.  Second, according to Vischer, “it 
also may subvert religious voices’ efforts to collectivize norms 
grounded in the moral anthropology.”123  Professor Vischer 
continues:  “[F]or subsidiarity to continue facilitating the 
common good as conceived of by Catholic social teaching, society 
must be persuaded to make room for multiple conceptions of the 
good, not simply seek to collectivize the Church’s 
anthropologically authentic conception.”124
If the point being made were that there exist today 
prudential reasons for tolerating in civil society the 
implementation of conceptions of the good for man that diverge 
from those taught by the Catholic magisterium, I should have to 
agree.  But that is not Professor Vischer’s point.  “Substantively,” 
according to Professor Vischer, “subsidiarity looks for power to be 
119  MESSNER, supra note 68, at 135; see Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 
8, at 55–58. 
120 Vischer, Subversion, supra note 118, at 277. 
121 Id. at 278. 
122 Id. at 279. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 278. 
MACRO_FL_BRENNAN 11/7/2006  8:56:42 AM 
2006] HARMONIZING PLURAL SOCIETIES 141 
 
exercised . . . with the ultimate aim . . . of furthering authentic 
human development.”125  That is as committal as I have found 
Vischer to be in print; one looks in vain for munera, the given 
functions of group persons, in Professor Vischer’s social ontology.  
Furthermore, instead of identifying and, as needed, assisting the 
authority that attends the proper discharge of a munus, 
subsidiarity in Professor Vischer’s hands is made to stand 
against implementing, from the ground up, the common good as 
Catholics understand it: 
If we claim that subsidiarity renders localization in a particular 
context valid only to the extent that the local body’s approach 
contributes to the common good, as defined by the truth claims 
of the moral anthropology [of the Church], we have emptied 
subsidiarity of its real-world meaning.  If localization’s validity 
is measured against a standard derived from a contested vision 
of the good, subsidiarity becomes a simple prop, justifying 
whatever vision of the good happens to hold sway in the 
political and legal spheres.126
As understood in the tradition of Catholic social thought, 
subsidiarity is not a principle that justifies subversion of claims 
on behalf of universal truths about the good for human and group 
persons.  Magisterial Catholic social thought affirms plural 
societies and their respective authorities, and it does this on the 
ground that each possesses a munus proprium, a share in the 
divine rule, which, as the ontological principle subsidiarity 
attests, is irreducibly its own in concert with other genuine 
societies.  Though it must be admitted that Catholic authors as 
well as others have said all manner of things about what 
subsidiarity amounts to, I read the Roman documents without 
finding a hint that subsidiarity is a principle of “value 
pluralism.”127  The pluralism that is implicated and affirmed by 
subsidiarity is a plurality of authorities, and authority for its 
125 Id. at 279. 
126 Id. at 309 (alteration in original). Which is not to deny, of course, that the 
Church affirms that concrete instantiation of the good can take myriad forms. 
127 Id. at 306. A less than precise application of the principle of subsidiary 
function occurs in the generally excellent The Catholic School on the Threshold of the 
Third Millennium: “A correct relationship between state and school, not only a 
Catholic school, is based not so much on institutional relations as on the right of 
each person to receive a suitable education of their free choice. This right is 
acknowledged according to the principle of subsidiarity.” Congregation for Catholic 
Education, The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium, 
L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Apr. 22, 1998, ¶ 17. 
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part, is discoverable in a particular society exactly to the extent 
that it is ordained immediately to its own good and mediately to 
the common good.  Any genuine authority is a share in divine 
providence, and the legitimacy of its exercise depends upon its 
being ordered to the good of individuals, group persons, and the 
common good.  In the words of the Catechism, which I quoted 
above: 
 God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power.  
He entrusts to every creature the functions [munera] it is 
capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own 
nature.  This mode of governance ought to be followed in social 
life.  The way God acts in governing the world, which bears 
witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire 
the wisdom of those who govern human communities.  They 
should behave as ministers of divine providence.128
Or as St. Thomas says, the human person participates in the 
divine governance in a particularly excellent way, being 
provident for himself, and this includes the opportunity and 
exigence to order all human living to the good, including the 
common good, and ultimately the separate common good that is 
God.129  Circumstances will dictate what is possible, but no 
principle of Catholic thought—and certainly not subsidiarity—
carves out pockets of lawlessness in the name of “value 
pluralism.” 
V. MAKING WAY FOR THE LASALLIAN MISSION 
How many American Catholics would be willing to affirm 
that “[s]ince it is the parents who have given life to their 
children, on them lies the gravest obligation of educating their 
family”?130  The quoted language comes from the Second Vatican 
Council, but many Catholics are more likely to call it Amish than 
they are to own it.  Many older Catholics will remember, of 
course, that Catholics are supposed to see that their children go 
to Catholic schools, but by now most Catholics seem to be, like 
the rest of the population, ready to eat meat on Fridays and let 
“the state” government do what it will with its schools and their 
children—so long, that is, as parents lucky enough to be able to 
afford religious (or other) schools can “opt out.”  Though we 
128 CATECHISM, supra note 59, ¶ 1884 (alteration in original). 
129 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 69, pt. I–II, Q. 91, art. 2, at 997. 
130 GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS, supra note 100, ¶ 3. 
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manage episodic (if temperate) outrage at the current state of 
affairs, most Americans, including Catholics, seem to be largely 
comfortable with the reality that parents who are unlucky 
enough to be poor or low-income have no “choice” but the local 
public schools, even though those schools frequently are—and 
there can be no serious dispute about the relevant facts—
abysmal.  Poor parents are denied the practical opportunity to 
meet this “gravest obligation,” yet protest is hardly heard.  While 
rich parents go on choosing their children’s education (whether it 
be at Sidwell Friends, say, or Portsmouth Abbey), poor and low-
income parents have no “choice” but to watch their children be 
conscripted by failing public schools.  According to the Second 
Vatican Council, 
 All people of whatever race, condition or age, in virtue of their 
dignity as human persons, have an inalienable right to 
education.  This education should be suitable to the particular 
destiny of the individuals, adapted to their ability, sex and 
national cultural traditions . . . .  True education aims to give 
people a formation which is directed towards their final end and 
the good of that society to which they belong and in which, as 
adults, they will have their share of duties to perform .131
Is this right to a true education no part of the American 
Catholic consciousness?  Why can American Catholics not come 
together in defense of the munus of the family and the correlative 
principle of subsidiarity as the criteria governing authentic 
parental choice over how, where, and by whom their children are 
to be educated?  Judged against the right and duty of all families 
to be the primary providers of an education shaped by the 
parents according to their view of the final end, and against the 
right of all children to receive such an education, the American 
educational system and state of affairs deserve a failing grade.  
Period.  Except to say that acquiescence in this moral abdication 
is a scandal that goes scandalously unrecognized. 
“Education is the process and vocation of shaping souls.”132  
131 Id. ¶ 1. 
132 Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the 
Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1882 (2001); see also Michael 
Scaperlanda, Realism, Freedom, and the Integral Development of the Human Person: 
A Catholic View of Education, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 76 (2005) (“[T]he 
Catholic Church envisions a dynamic interplay among the parents, religious 
institutions, and the state in providing each child with an education. Each 
institution—i.e., family, Church, and state—has its own unique and complementary 
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The work La Salle and his Institute made their own was made 
necessary by poor families’ structural inability to meet their 
vocation to their children.  Saint La Salle described the Brothers’ 
work as “one of the most important and most necessary services 
in the church, one entrusted to [them] by pastors and by fathers 
and mothers.”133  Their “holy ministry,” La Salle taught his 
Brothers, is nothing less than to “fulfill the function of guardian 
angels” for the children entrusted to them.134  “You share in the 
ministry of the guardian angels by making known to children the 
truths of the gospel, which God has chosen you to announce . . . .  
This is why Jesus Christ has sent you and why the church, whose 
ministers you are, employs you.”135 Those whom “God has 
entrusted . . . with so holy a ministry . . . he will summon . . . for 
a very exact account on the day of judgment.”136
Eliminating the systemic injustice in the American 
educational apparatus requires realigning and harmonizing, for 
the first time in a long time in the American experiment, the 
societies that are Church, family, and school, and putting the 
state to work for those societies and the persons whom they 
nurture.  Nearly all the relevant cultural vectors are headed in 
the wrong direction, and their magnitude is growing.  The idea 
that above all leads, when acted upon, to a systemic stifling of 
the Lasallian initiative—or, more broadly, to poor parents’ 
opportunity to fulfill their educational duty to their children—is 
the idea that rightful authority comes from the state down, 
rather from creation and redemption to individuals and specific 
societies as shares in the divine ruling power.  The cultural 
situation we confront has more in common with La Salle’s world 
than first meets the eye.  La Salle knew, and we are reminded in 
the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, that 
society is built properly when it is “built on a family scale.”137  
Righting the educational injustice in our nation requires giving 
effect to a principle that is terribly out of tune with our 
globalizing, homogenizing, straitening tendencies:  Plural 
societies—plural group persons—possessed of their respective 
role to play in the formation of the child.”). 
133 KOCH, supra note 36, at 53. 
134 Id. at 47. 
135 Id. at 51, 55. 
136 Id. at 49–50. 
137 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 213. 
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munera are to be given subsidium, both the respect they deserve 
and what help they require. 
 
